Acquiring Minds · longitudinal synthesis · as of June 1, 2026

374 episodes, distilled
A first-time searcher’s playbook.

Every full-length Acquiring Minds episode was transcribed and mined for concrete lessons across four stages of the journey: search & sourcing, due diligence, post-close operating, and tactical takeaways. The 4,885 resulting “atoms” were clustered into 52 themes — each one a claim supported by named episodes and a representative quote.

Synthesized from acquiringminds.co/episodes using Haiku 4.5 extraction + Sonnet 4.6 / Opus 4.7 synthesis. Every claim links back to source episodes. Badge color encodes confidence: emerald = 20+ eps · blue = 10–19 · amber = 3–9.

374
episodes mined
4,885
atoms extracted
52
themes synthesized
1
reader (you)
Playbook

Pre-close & Due Diligence Playbook

The diligence surprises that recur across deals, the seller behaviors that obscure them, and the deal-structure levers — seller notes, working capital pegs, asset-vs-stock — that distinguish buyers who close cleanly from those who fight fires in year one.

12 themes · 841 atoms analyzed · sorted by support count

38 ep
deal_almost_died

Deals die most often in the final 2–4 weeks — seller cold feet, lender issues, and last-minute discoveries are the leading causes

A consistent pattern emerges: after months of diligence and tens of thousands in legal fees, sellers get cold feet when they introduce the new owner to employees, lenders switch underwriters mid-process, or a late discovery (tax lien, compliance issue, adverse customer event) triggers a crisis. Multiple buyers describe spending $40,000–$60,000 in diligence costs only to have sellers walk away days before closing. The antidote is building seller trust through consistent communication, having backup lenders ready, and structuring seller notes that give the seller skin in the post-close outcome.

“about 45 minutes before that meeting, the broker called and said, Hey, I'm not sure what's going on. The deal's off. Sellers just called me. I don't have any more details than that. Sorry.”

Caveat Some late-breaking crises resolved well: dominick-blue-air-asap-pure-air-san-diego switched lenders three days before closing and saved the deal; kirk-olson-mikes-fencing re-engaged a seller who had walked twice and ultimately closed.

12 source episodes
John Murphy Brett Maxam Julie Hottinger, Janna Hottinger Joe Wechsler Cassie Niekamp, Morli Desai, Anne Ristic Dominic Blue Justus Luttig Matt Orley Jordan Carter Kirk Olsson Don Gourley Kevin Bibelhausen
35 ep
deal_structure

SBA lenders vary dramatically — treating them as interchangeable costs you deals and adds months to your timeline

The 80/10/10 structure (80% SBA, 10% seller note, 10% equity) is the most common self-funded deal template, but lenders interpret SBA guidelines differently on issues like seller note standby periods, variable vs. fixed rates, and industry eligibility. Buyers who concentrated on one lender mid-process were exposed when that lender's underwriter changed, the bank went into receivership, or the deal didn't fit the lender's box. Advisors recommend working with 2–3 lenders simultaneously until closing, and using a capital advisor with multiple bank relationships rather than going direct to a single institution.

“I thought all SBA lending was the same, and it is not the same. A capital advisor will have a whole briefcase full of banks that they use and can get your deal to the right bank.”

Caveat Some buyers found 100% SBA financing without a seller note to be a decisive competitive advantage when sellers were fatigued by process complexity (kirk-olson-mikes-fencing). A few deals were also done faster and cheaper with all-equity (ania-aliev-life-support-systems-lss) or all-cash when the deal was small enough.

12 source episodes
Brian Seeling Dave Gilbert Dominic Blue Marvin Karlow Barker Squire Avery Tomek Adam Markley James Bloom Adam Vandermyde Joe Springsteen Lucas Phillips Matt Durniak
28 ep
dd_surprises

Advertised SDE is almost always overstated — plan for a 15–25% haircut before you've even opened QuickBooks

Across dozens of episodes, buyers discovered that SIM-presented earnings were 20–25% higher than what diligence confirmed, driven by inflated add-backs, deferred expenses, and shared-resource allocation that won't transfer. Sellers — even honest ones — systematically defer maintenance capex, underpay family members on the books, and count one-time revenue as recurring. The safest underwriting posture is to assume the real number is 80 cents on every advertised dollar until your QoE proves otherwise.

“when you're thinking about 90% confidence interval what of what a business is actually generating the advertised earnings are almost always higher than what they wind up being on day one”

Caveat A handful of episodes describe genuinely clean books where tax returns matched P&Ls line-for-line (daniel-batista-candeeland-downey, marvin-karlow-raincatcher, james-maxwell-commercial-cleaning). Clean books are a differentiator worth paying a premium for.

12 source episodes
Brian Seeling Colin King Avery Tomek Joseph Ziolkowski Andrew Harbin Joe Wynn Chandler Reed Julia Grant Hensel Ken Eyjolfson Dave Gilbert Marci Larouech Seay Kinza Azmat
25 ep
dd_surprises

Buyers consistently underestimate how much value lives in the owner's head, relationships, and daily presence — not in the business systems

The most common post-close surprise is not financial but operational: the owner was doing far more than anyone knew, and the business didn't have the management depth or documented processes to survive their departure. This manifests as undocumented customer relationships, unwritten estimates, informal supplier terms, and operational knowledge that was never captured. Shadow the owner for at least two full weeks before close, map every customer relationship to a specific employee or system, and ask explicitly about the owner's daily schedule hour by hour.

“I probably under appreciated and frankly under diligenced just how involved he was and what might be needed — you know, rehiring, wanting to replace him.”

Caveat Franchise businesses with documented systems (jeff-flannery-hand-and-stone, chirag-shah-sit-means-sit-austin) are structurally better at reducing owner dependency, though they introduce franchisor compliance obligations instead.

12 source episodes
Adrian Pinto Jack Carr Enrique Rodriguez Adam Goldberg Jared Pierce Ben Jasper George Tibil and Keith Fields Don Grigg Greg Bruns Matt Orley Alex Glasner Chelsea Wood
24 ep
winning_against_other_bidders

In most sub-$5M deals, sellers choose on fit and certainty of close — not highest price

Across dozens of competitive situations, buyers who won were rarely the highest bidders. The decisive factors were: (1) personal rapport with the seller and alignment on legacy/employee treatment, (2) speed and simplicity of structure (avoiding a lengthy SBA process when the seller had suffered through it before), and (3) credible certainty of close (pre-approved SBA, committed capital, or all-cash). Buyers who emphasized PE-style financial engineering or brought too many advisors into early seller meetings frequently lost to less sophisticated but more personable buyers.

“I came in at 1.475 million and the full price offers, there were five other offers at 1 and 1/2... I was not the highest bidder... and why do you think you won the deal?”

Caveat In brokered auctions with many qualified buyers (david-graf-danhard had 14 bidders; aj-wasserstein notes competitive tension raises prices), price does matter. Seller fit wins on direct/off-market deals; price matters more in brokered processes.

11 source episodes
Barker Squire Joe Springsteen Obby Robbie Shankar Josh Key Chirag Shah Alex Michael Elliott Edge Joe Wynn Fraser Voll Ben Jasper Chris Jones
22 ep
seller_obscured_or_hid

Sellers routinely obscure the fact that one employee holds all the customer relationships — and that employee may walk on Day 1

Multiple buyers discovered post-close that a single salesperson, technician, or ops manager was the actual relationship holder for the top 2–3 customers, while the owner downplayed this dependency during diligence. Sellers sometimes 'green the workforce' in the 1–2 years before sale — replacing experienced (expensive) staff with cheaper workers to inflate margins — creating hidden compliance risks and capability gaps. Pre-close, you cannot meet employees in most deals; securing key employees with written stay bonuses and employment agreements before or at close is essential.

“employees who basically say they're leaving. They're done. And are critical. if they leave and they walk out the door, and they take those customers with them, I mean, that's just devastating.”

Caveat In some cases the apparent weakness became a strength: matt-obrien-fedex-professional-fence reports that the key employee dependency they feared turned into the greatest gift after the employee committed to the new owner.

11 source episodes
Alex Mears Jack Carr George Tibil and Keith Fields Brett Kennedy Chandler Reed Enrique Rodriguez Grania Michel Lucas Phillips Jared Pierce Matt O'Brien JD Hassley
22 ep
deal_structure

A seller note is your best single tool for risk alignment — sellers who refuse one are telling you something important about their confidence

The seller note functions as more than financing: it keeps the seller financially accountable for the representations they've made, since they won't get paid the full note if the business implodes from undisclosed issues. Holdbacks tied to specific triggers (revenue confirmation, compliance verification) proved especially valuable in deals where late-stage red flags emerged. Conversely, buyers who closed without any seller note — particularly those who had been burned by earlier lender failures or who were anxious to close — reported having less leverage to remediate post-close surprises. A 10–15% seller note minimum is a consistent recommendation across advisors.

“a seller's note is the way to really share that risk and there is a risk. You don't have the underlying marketing processes.”

Caveat Some deals required dropping seller note demands to win: kirk-olson-mikes-fencing won only after acquiescing to the seller's refusal to carry any note. In these cases the buyer accepted higher financing risk but gained deal certainty.

10 source episodes
Chandra Rao Anika John Joe Wechsler Eric Hayes August Felker-Oberle Chandler Reed lincoln-buckheit-kevin-black Andrew Stordeur Fred McGill Dustin Fusillo
19 ep
seller_obscured_or_hid

Sellers misrepresent inventory quality and equipment condition far more often than they misrepresent revenue — get an independent inspection

Buyers across manufacturing, landscaping, e-commerce, and service businesses discovered post-close that inventory was obsolete, equipment had barely functioned for years, or infrastructure was concealed as operational when it was failing. In inventory-heavy businesses, applying a 12–18 month activity rule (any SKU unsold in that window is stale) and doing a physical count before close are minimum standards. Equipment inspections by independent mechanics or engineers consistently surfaced issues sellers described as 'working fine.'

“I didn't do due diligence on the inventory. What was the inventory really worth? Nothing. I ended up spending the first six months buying containers and filling them with garbage.”

Caveat Inventory surprises can go in the buyer's favor: matt-kopp-enduring-investment discovered $400k in unlisted inventory not on the balance sheet — the seller's accounting system was under-reporting assets, not overstating them.

10 source episodes
Adam Goldberg Chad Fondriest Adrian Pinto Cassie Niekamp, Morli Desai, Anne Ristic Matt Durniak Matt Huggins Jeff Felker Matt Kopp Andrew Harbin Dan Verboski
18 ep
deal_structure

Working capital is always the last thing negotiated and the first thing that hurts you — it should be the first

A recurring theme: buyers focus on purchase price and leverage ratio, then treat working capital adjustment as a rounding error to be sorted at closing. Post-close, inadequate working capital in project-based, seasonal, or fast-growing businesses leads to cash crises within 60–90 days. The SBA's new-entity credit history problem (for asset sales creating new entities) means trade credit that existed for the previous entity evaporates at close. Buyers are advised to model working capital needs for the first 120 days explicitly, negotiate the working capital target as a defined dollar peg in the APA, and budget a post-close liquidity reserve of 2–3 months of payroll.

“when you're in the search phase and in the negotiating phase for a business, working capital tends to be like the last thing you think about — people don't even want to really bring it up until fairly close.”

Caveat Some buyers deliberately over-equitized to ensure working capital buffers (andrew-kurzrok-hopewell-sheet-metal chose not to take SBA minimum 10% equity; jonathan-taylor-aek-technology used 65% senior debt rather than maximizing leverage), which constrained returns but protected operational stability.

10 source episodes
Bradley Roofner and Logan Brown Brandon Laughridge Dan Angel Andrew Kurszrock Joe Soelberg Chandra Rao Adrian Pinto Avery Tomek Dan Verboski John Ikalowych
16 ep
dd_surprises

COVID-inflated financials are still being used to justify valuations — normalize aggressively or you're buying a peak that already passed

Buyers who closed in 2021–2023 on businesses with 2020–2021 earnings frequently discovered post-close that the COVID boom had already reversed. FedEx routes valued at 4.6x peak-COVID EBITDA declined rapidly when volume normalized. E-commerce and consumer businesses that grew 30–50% during lockdowns reverted to pre-pandemic trend lines. The correct approach is to construct a normalized 3–5 year average that includes COVID years rather than using peak-year multiples, and to get the seller's written representations about trend lines in the final months of diligence.

“I bought it when interest rates were very low on a variable loan. The earnings I think were not actually what the earnings were. So, therefore an even higher price. Volume started to slip.”

Caveat adam-rao-triple20 used a 3-year rolling average including COVID as a conservative valuation approach — the seller accepted a lower price and the buyer acquired at a defensible multiple, showing the method can work for both parties.

9 source episodes
Avery Tomek Adam Ralph Garth Fasano Jerham Wren Joe Odell Andrew Stordeur Adam Ralph Justin Willess Joe Odell
15 ep
deal_structure

The asset vs. stock sale decision has non-obvious consequences that can cost more than the tax difference — understand them before the LOI

Asset sales create a new legal entity, which triggers: vendor credit renegotiation from zero history, loss of legacy licenses (contractor's license, insurance rating, government contracts), customer consent requirements in some contracts, and SBA working capital constraints from lenders' credit-history minimums on new entities. Stock sales preserve these but transfer unknown liabilities — one buyer was served papers for a 4-year-old car accident on Day 3. Sophisticated buyers use F-reorganizations or 338(h)(10) elections to get asset-sale tax treatment while maintaining entity continuity for licenses and contracts.

“the last acquisition we did, the third day we were there, we're literally sitting in the conference room with the owners and they got served papers for a car accident like four years ago — and it's the buyer's problem under a stock sale.”

Caveat Stock sales can create mutual value: john-hubbard-express-custom-trailers-2 completed a stock purchase that saved the founders capital gains tax, translating to an effective 25% discount on the purchase price for the buyer — a genuine win-win when used intentionally.

9 source episodes
Adrian Pinto Alicia Powers Brett Kennedy John Hubbard Anika John Kinza Azmat Andrew Kurszrock Jake Bittner Adrian Pinto
12 ep
deal_structure

On seller notes, fight for amortization length over interest rate — 10 years at 7% beats 3 years at 5% every time on cash flow

Multiple buyers independently arrived at the same insight: a seller note's monthly payment is far more constrained by the amortization period than by the interest rate. At a $500k seller note, the difference between 7% and 5% interest is roughly $500/month; the difference between a 3-year and a 10-year term is over $8,000/month. Sellers often care about headline interest rate (because that's what they quote to their accountant), giving buyers room to concede on rate while winning on term. A 10-year seller note at market interest rates is the target structure for preserving post-close cash flow.

“I'm happy to write a seller note for 7% if I can get 10 years. I'm very happy to do that.”

Caveat For fatigued sellers who want out fast, pushing for seller notes at all can lose deals — kirk-olson-mikes-fencing won by giving up the seller note entirely and going 100% SBA, accepting higher monthly payments to close quickly.

8 source episodes
Abhi Ravishankar Obby Robbie Shankar Bryan Houck Adam Markley Aizik Zimmerman Andrew Kurszrock Joe Soelberg Kyle Boyden and Jake Furfaro
Playbook

Post-close Operating Reality

What the first 12 months actually look like — employee walkouts, working capital shocks, vendor-credit resets, hidden upside, and the predictable emotional arc that catches first-time owners off guard.

12 themes · 874 atoms analyzed · sorted by support count

35 ep
systems_and_tech_debt

Every acquired SMB carries operational tech debt — from paper-based CRMs to broken QuickBooks to missing management layers — that consumes the first 6–12 months

The pattern is nearly universal: the business ran on founder memory, paper notebooks, and relationship-based tribal knowledge with no documented systems. One buyer destroyed QuickBooks during a migration and spent three weeks on pen-and-paper accounting (alan-lochridge-the-stone-man). Another inherited a CRM that was literally 'a stack of paper.' A construction business had a chart of accounts so messy that a second bookkeeper needed to be hired to rebuild it transaction by transaction (dustin-fusillo-atm-parts-service-nextatm). First-time buyers consistently underestimate the time — typically 3–9 months of focused effort — required just to achieve financial visibility, let alone operational improvement.

“I had to shut QuickBooks down, I had to pay a third party to essentially rebuild it and we were on pen and paper for three weeks.”

Caveat A handful of buyers found unexpectedly robust systems (chirag-shah-sit-means-sit-austin inherited a full Salesforce instance; jake-bittner-qlarion inherited working finance and HR processes). Older, larger businesses in regulated industries tend to have better foundational infrastructure.

12 source episodes
Alan Lochridge Dustin Fusillo Adam Salmen Alicia Powers Chandler Reed Enrique Rodriguez Jack Carr Chandra Rao Bradley Roofner and Logan Brown Dan Verboski Damon Clarkson Evan Stewart
28 ep
cash_flow_shocks

Working capital draws $100K–$500K+ out of the buyer's pocket in the first 90 days even with strong financing in place

Buyers routinely discover their working capital estimates were 2–3x too low. In landscaping, every new crew launch requires $60–70K in equipment (trucks, mowers, tools) while the new entity cannot get post-close equipment financing at reasonable rates — one buyer called 30 banks without success (adrian-pinto-georgia-scapes-mike-botkin-oneoutdoor). In construction, project payment delays of 30–90 days force the buyer to personally fund payroll gaps. Sellers in asset-purchase deals often lose their established vendor credit terms, forcing cash-on-delivery with suppliers (andrew-kurzrok-hopewell-sheet-metal). Getting a line of credit at SBA close is nearly impossible to add afterward for 1–3 years.

“if you don't get that line of credit as part of your SBA package your ability to get it afterwards is essentially zero for a year or two or three.”

Caveat Some buyers in high-cash-flow, fast-collection businesses (derek-croft-licedoctors: same-day cash collection; alan-lochridge-the-stone-man: 8-day DSO) experienced minimal working capital strain. The shock is most acute in project-based construction, seasonal services, and high-growth situations.

10 source episodes
Adrian Pinto Alicia Powers Chandler Reed Fred McGill Andrew Kurszrock Dan Verboski Corey Robinson Adam Vandermyde Heather Shattuck Heidorn Greg Bruns
24 ep
second_guessing_moments

The post-close emotional arc is predictable: a 6-month honeymoon, then 12–18 months of grinding self-doubt and isolation

Multiple operators describe the same arc with striking similarity. The first weeks feel exciting and full of potential. Then operational realities hit — cash is tighter than expected, key employees leave, customers don't transfer cleanly, and the owner is working 60–80 hour weeks alone without a peer group. One buyer summarized: 'your first six months are honeymoon, the next year and a half is just day after day after day of struggle' (alex-glasner-workpays-2). Another described post-close panic as universal: 'they all feel like they're going to throw up... my whole life is over' (chelsea-wood-acquisition-lab). The isolation is acute because small business owners have no boss, no teammates, and no clear performance review.

“it's these first — it's your first six months are honeymoon, the next year and a half after that is just day after day after day of struggle.”

Caveat Buyers with financial runway (breathing room to make mistakes), strong co-owners with complementary emotional styles (adam-rao-triple20: optimist/pessimist pair), or businesses with existing management layers report significantly less acute second-guessing. Resilience appears correlated with liquidity reserves above 6 months of debt service.

10 source episodes
Alex Glasner Chelsea Wood Chris Edwards Adam Ralph Damon Clarkson Dan Burnside Eric Calderon Ben Jasper Barker Squire Gantt Elmore, Matt Moldenhauer
22 ep
attrition_customer_employee_vendor

Employee walkouts — including complete team departures on day one — are far more common than buyers anticipate

Multiple operators describe losing key staff in the first hours or days of ownership: all three HVAC techs quit on day one (jack-carr), three of seven journeymen electricians left in the first six months (chandra-rao-miller), and trade show exhibit companies experienced 100% inherited team attrition within a year (ivona-butcher-beire). Workers loyal to the prior owner, resistant to change, or harboring resentment over the ownership transition leave without warning. The first instinct is panic, but rapid rebuilding is usually possible — and sometimes the forced turnover accelerates the culture reset buyers eventually wanted anyway.

“day one all my techs quit on me. So, I didn't... all three techs quit on me.”

Caveat Several buyers (chirag-shah-sit-means-sit-austin, august-felker-oberle-risk-strategies, evan-stewart-direct-one) experienced near-zero post-close attrition when the prior owner built strong culture and communicated the transition well. Good pre-close preparation with employees — individually assuring them about job security — dramatically reduces walkout risk.

10 source episodes
Jack Carr Chandra Rao Adam Ralph Adam Ralph Andrew Harbin Barker Squire Adam Goldberg James Maxwell Ben Jasper Chris Edwards
20 ep
cash_flow_shocks

Actual EBITDA in year one typically runs 20–40% below the trailing twelve months used to price the deal — the J-curve is real and underplanned

The convergence of transition costs — unplanned hires to replace seller functions, vendor credit resets, system implementation costs, key employee departure and replacement, and debt service — compresses real owner earnings sharply in year one. Pool service consolidators describe EBITDA 'in the teens' during year-one integration (abhi-ravishankar-truss-one-partners). A candle manufacturer spent the first six months 'buying containers and filling them with garbage at $1,000 a crack' to clear inherited inventory. A sign company spent nearly $100K on vehicle repairs in year one — trucks that looked fine in diligence but weren't maintained (dan-verboski-leons-signs). Buyers who model only seller-stated SDE without a 20–30% first-year haircut and $50–150K in unplanned transition spend routinely find themselves short.

“definitely gone through the big J curve of the first year in terms of EBITDA — we still maintaining that in the teens — and the J-curve was, I mean, I knew what to expect.”

Caveat Buyers in well-run businesses with existing management teams and clean books (chirag-shah-sit-means-sit-austin; august-felker-oberle-risk-strategies) sometimes outperform TTM EBITDA in year one. Deals with seller earnouts that continue through year one also tend to show stable performance since the seller remains motivated.

10 source episodes
Abhi Ravishankar Adam Goldberg Dan Verboski Barker Squire Adam Ralph Chandler Reed Ben Jasper Damon Clarkson Eric Calderon Alicia Powers
19 ep
first_90_days_surprises

The seller was doing three invisible jobs — and you don't discover this until day two

A recurring first-week shock: the prior owner wore unacknowledged hats in sales, customer relationships, technical production, and cultural glue that don't show up in an org chart. One landscaping buyer spent the first two days of ownership in a crisis realizing the prior owner handled everything and he could not replace it himself (adrian-pinto-georgia-scapes-2). A candle manufacturer discovered that half their customers were waiting for the founder to leave before abandoning the business (adam-goldberg-seracon). A commercial cleaning buyer learned that '22 years of resident knowledge cannot be replaced as easily as you think.' These discoveries typically require an immediate, unplanned, and expensive new hire within the first 30–60 days.

“I shadowed him, went to some customers, I saw him interacting with his customers and I was like I'm not sure that I'm gonna be able to replace it.”

Caveat Buyers who met employees before close, negotiated longer seller transition periods (6–12 months on-site), or acquired businesses with existing management layers (chirag-shah-sit-means-sit-austin, edward-mcdonnell-botanical-designs) faced far gentler transitions. The problem is worst in owner-operator businesses under $1M SDE with no middle management.

10 source episodes
Adrian Pinto Adam Goldberg James Maxwell Christian Bateson Fred McGill Clayton Collins Don Grigg Aizik Zimmerman Gat Caperton Enrique Rodriguez
17 ep
first_90_days_surprises

The business plan you bought is obsolete within 60–90 days — plan for discovery, not execution

Buyers repeatedly describe realizing post-close that the business they modeled in diligence is materially different from what they now own. 'My business plan was in the trash within six months' (don-grigg-big-adventures). A trade show business planned to do $1M in revenue in Q4 and generated $500K (ivona-butcher-beire). A pool service consolidator described a J-curve EBITDA dip in year one as integration reality diverged from the model. The root cause is that diligence is epistemological — you learn what the seller shows you. Full operational access reveals cost structures, customer quality, systems gaps, and key person dependencies that change the unit economics materially.

“my business plan was in the trash within six months.”

Caveat Some buyers (chirag-shah-sit-means-sit-austin, jacob-lee-scenthound, james-temple-mathnasium) described the first 90 days as outperforming the business plan. Franchise acquisitions with established playbooks and well-run seller transitions tend to deliver more predictable early performance than independent owner-operator deals.

10 source episodes
Don Grigg Adam Ralph Alex Glasner Adam Ralph Abhi Ravishankar Adam Goldberg Barker Squire Eric Calderon Avery Tomek Dave Gilbert
16 ep
attrition_customer_employee_vendor

Leading blue-collar workers who know more about the trade than you is a distinct and underestimated leadership challenge

Buyers from corporate, finance, or consulting backgrounds consistently underestimate how differently blue-collar field teams respond to leadership authority. When a new owner cannot perform the core trade (HVAC repair, plumbing, electrical work, hydromulching), the crew tests credibility through small acts of non-compliance before larger ones. One owner noted: 'leading a group of blue-collar employees that know you don't know as much as they do is harder than leading in corporate' (eric-hayes-rocky-mountain-reclamation). Multiple buyers found that working shoulder-to-shoulder with crews — loading trucks, visiting job sites, learning the physical work — built more trust faster than any formal management initiative. The most dangerous assumption is that corporate management skills transfer directly.

“leading a group of blue-collar employees that know that you don't know as much about that specific thing as they do is harder than leading a group of people where they're pretty confident you know things.”

Caveat Several buyers with no trade experience (adam-borcz-delta-installation-group in commercial furniture installation; alicia-powers-price-builders in general contracting) built high-performing teams by deeply investing in employee support infrastructure — signing bonuses, health insurance upgrades, transparent profit sharing — rather than technical credibility. The investment path works but costs more upfront.

10 source episodes
Eric Hayes Alex Holley Austin Smoak Adam Borcz Chandra Rao Ben Bortner James Maxwell Fred McGill Brian Lee Shields Greg Bruns
15 ep
cross-cutting

Post-close discovery cuts both ways: hidden problems are common, but so are hidden assets — underpriced services, loyal customers, and untapped demand

The negative surprises dominate acquisition narratives, but buyers also routinely discover upside that wasn't visible in diligence. A lice treatment business discovered it was turning away 40%+ of leads due to staffing constraints — not market saturation (derek-croft-licedoctors). A candle business's legacy website from 1999 had powerful SEO that a complete rebuild would have destroyed (andrew-stordeur-all-things-cedar). Buyers who raised prices immediately post-close — because prior owners hadn't increased them since 2015 — saw direct EBITDA expansion in week one (james-maxwell-commercial-cleaning; derek-croft-licedoctors). And several buyers discovered that businesses that 'survived in spite of themselves' — no CRM, no marketing — were actually proof of strong product-market fit with enormous growth runway.

“If a business is doing well in spite of itself, in spite of not having a CRM or doing any marketing — it says something about the prospects of that business.”

Caveat Hidden upside is easiest to find in lifestyle-run businesses where the prior owner deliberately suppressed growth, left prices at legacy levels, and avoided adding infrastructure. It is least common in businesses that were already aggressively optimized by a sophisticated prior owner.

9 source episodes
Derek Croft Andrew Stordeur James Maxwell Adam Ralph Adam Borcz Garth Fasano August Felker-Oberle Chirag Shah George Vallone
14 ep
first_90_days_surprises

Customers tied to the prior owner's personal relationships can vanish immediately after close — and they rarely warn you during diligence

In relationship-driven businesses, a portion of customers are loyal to the founder personally, not the business. When the founder departs, those customers leave too — sometimes within days of close. A candle manufacturer lost half their major retail volume within weeks (adam-goldberg-seracon: 'the buyers abandoned us very quickly'). A fractional CFO firm discovered its customer concentration was 30% (not the 10% advertised) once they understood the PE portfolio company structure (dave-gilbert-proven). The most dangerous version is founder-dependent recurring revenue that appears recurring in the financials but is actually a personal relationship that won't survive transition.

“Half of their volume was coming from major retailers. As soon as I bought the business, the buyers abandoned us very quickly. They wouldn't return my phone calls.”

Caveat Multiple acquirers — especially in B2B services with long customer tenure — were pleasantly surprised by customer stickiness post-close. August Felker (august-felker-oberle-risk-strategies) retained most insurance clients despite fears; the key was showing up in person and personally committing to service standards. Customers in industries with high switching costs (plumbing maintenance contracts, long-term cleaning agreements) rarely leave on ownership change alone.

8 source episodes
Adam Goldberg Dave Gilbert Christian Bateson Chandra Rao Don Grigg Fred McGill George Goates Eric Calderon
14 ep
second_guessing_moments

Year one ownership reliably strains marriages, disrupts family life, and creates an isolation that is genuinely surprising to first-time buyers

The emotional and relational cost of acquisition rarely appears in investor memos. Buyers describe working 17-hour days in the first 90 days (austin-smoak-grove-oaks-capital), relocating families to rural markets that cause 'really hard' adjustment on spouses and children (dan-burnside-parker-mechanical), and discovering that having a spouse in the business adds strain to 'the nicest, most lovely marriage' (heather-shattuck-heidorn-the-tailored-closet). The weight of payroll responsibility — hitting 'push' for the first time on 23 employees' paychecks — produces a visceral, physical reaction (ana-lia-barragan-kelly-green: 'I like couldn't breathe'). Unlike corporate jobs, the owner cannot leave the problems at work — they are the personal guarantor of every obligation.

“the first time I pushed that button I like couldn't breathe.”

Caveat Some buyers — especially those who planned for reduced income, set firm work boundaries, or had spousal partners already invested in the outcome — report the lifestyle as genuinely better than corporate within 18–24 months. The key variable appears to be financial runway: buyers with 12+ months of personal savings describe lower anxiety and less family friction.

9 source episodes
Austin Smoak Dan Burnside Heather Shattuck Heidorn Gabe Perez and Kristen Perez Alex Glasner Chris Edwards Mark Andergg Adam Vandermyde Eric Calderon
12 ep
attrition_customer_employee_vendor

Asset purchase structures silently reset vendor credit terms to day zero, forcing cash-on-delivery while you have the least liquidity

In an asset purchase (the dominant SMB acquisition structure), the new legal entity has zero credit history. Vendors who gave the prior owner net-30 or net-60 terms frequently demand COD or prepayment from the buyer's fresh LLC — even when the same team and operations continue (andrew-kurzrok-hopewell-sheet-metal). Landscaping buyers discover equipment dealers quote financing rates so high they must self-fund truck and mower purchases out of pocket. The compounding effect — simultaneously managing SBA debt service, reduced vendor terms, and growth capital needs — creates a cash squeeze in months 1–6 that the financial model never captured. Negotiating some vendor credit back typically takes 12–24 months of payment history.

“Others said, 'Wait a minute, this is a brand new minted LLC that doesn't have any history. Our corporate policy is we don't give terms the way we gave to somebody from 1990.'”

Caveat Stock purchase structures and some asset purchases in niche industries with long-standing supplier relationships preserve credit terms. Buyers who proactively contact key vendors before close and provide personal guarantees sometimes negotiate continuation of prior terms from day one.

6 source episodes
Andrew Kurszrock Adrian Pinto Dan Verboski Adam Borcz Alicia Powers Damon Clarkson
Playbook

Tactical Cheat Sheet

Specific DD questions to add to your checklist, red flags to refuse to ignore, and advice repeated so often across operators that it functions as consensus wisdom.

14 themes · 1,291 atoms analyzed · sorted by support count

34 ep
dd_questions_to_add

Map every customer's revenue share, tenure, and loyalty to the business — not just to the seller

Customer concentration appears in more episodes than any other single DD topic. The risk is two-dimensional: (1) raw revenue concentration (a single customer at 30-40%+ creates existential exposure), and (2) relationship concentration — whether the customer's loyalty is with the business or with the exiting founder personally. Buyers report losing their largest customer within months of close when they skipped direct customer conversations before signing. A 30-year relationship is not a substitute for a pre-close phone call. Counter-evidence is equally instructive: several buyers accepted high concentration and succeeded because they could point to 15-30 year relationship tenure, contractual stickiness, or government-contractor lock-in.

“The worst case scenario when you skip customer diligence is the loss of your largest customer immediately upon close.”

Caveat High concentration is manageable — and sometimes a strength — when backed by 20+ year relationships, multi-year contracts, or government procurement requirements. Adam Borcz and others succeeded with concentrated customers that hadn't churned through recessions and COVID.

12 source episodes
Adam Goldberg Andy Rougeot Christian Bateson Adam Borcz Fred McGill John Schuler Damon Clarkson Dave Gilbert Nicholas James Scott Duncan Paul Lajoie Peter Wild and Carlos Laconi
33 ep
dd_questions_to_add

Distinguish true recurring revenue from repeat revenue and project-based revenue — they have different risk profiles, valuations, and cash flow patterns

This theme recurs in 33+ episodes across a wide range of industries. Buyers must understand whether revenue is (1) truly recurring — contracted, multi-year, subscription-style, (2) repeat — customers return regularly but without obligation, or (3) project-based — lumpy, one-time, dependent on backlog. Project-based businesses require 12-18 months of verified backlog, detailed WIP tracking, and cash flow stress-testing. Recurring revenue can justify higher multiples but must be audited for hidden churn. The most common mistake: paying a recurring-revenue multiple for a business that actually operates on a project or bid model.

“A healthy business has a year and a half of backlog. He had a month.”

Caveat A strong project-based business with long customer relationships, verified multi-year backlog, and above-market margins can outperform a weak recurring-revenue business. Adam Borcz acquired a non-recurring commercial furniture installer that survived COVID without missing a beat because of 30-year relationship depth.

12 source episodes
Sandy Page Bradley Roofner and Logan Brown Eric Calderon Enrique Rodriguez Sean Stimpson Scott Alexander Matt O'Brien John Ikalowych Matthew Pohl Alicia Powers David Page Bruce Vann
27 ep
advice_to_first_time_buyer

Understand SBA mechanics — including working capital lines, leverage limits, and lender variation — before you sign an LOI, not during diligence

SBA financing surprises surface in 27 episodes. First-time buyers consistently underestimate: (1) that SBA lenders vary significantly in appetite, structure, and speed — having 2-3 lender relationships before you need one is essential, (2) that asset purchases create entities with no credit history, blocking working capital and equipment lines for 1-3 years post-close, (3) that SBA won't bend for obvious growth scenarios — secure all post-close financing at close, (4) that stress-testing debt service at variable rates 2-3% above current levels changes deal attractiveness materially, and (5) that timing the close relative to business seasonality can erase 30-40% of historical earnings for the SBA trailing-12 calculation.

“SBA financing is a double-edged sword with strict underwriting that won't bend for obvious growth scenarios — secure all post-close financing at close.”

Caveat In deals above $4-5M enterprise value, conventional financing or SBIC funds often work better than SBA. Independent sponsors and traditional search funds with committed equity capital face fewer of these constraints. SBA complexity is primarily a first-time, self-funded buyer problem.

12 source episodes
Adrian Pinto Brian Seeling Avery Tomek Chad Hildebrand Dominic Blue Zack Mutnik Devin Fitzgerald Marvin Karlow Scott Walton Jordan Novgrod Garth Fasano Joseph Ziolkowski
24 ep
dd_questions_to_add

Require proof-of-cash and a QofE before LOI — never rely on seller-stated SDE or broker-adjusted P&Ls

Across dozens of episodes, buyers who skipped a formal quality-of-earnings (QofE) review or failed to trace stated SDE back to bank statements and tax returns discovered material mismatches after close. Common culprits include PPP loans and EIDL grants hidden in revenue, year-end inventory purchases used to reduce taxable income, QuickBooks records disconnected from actual operations, and multi-entity carve-outs with intermingled financials. The consistent advice: hire a third-party QofE provider (not just an accountant) before signing, and require that tax returns match P&Ls line-for-line.

“One I looked at closely had five locations... the books didn't match the tax returns and it just was very messy. So I passed on it.”

Caveat A small number of buyers (particularly those purchasing very small cash-based businesses under $300K SDE) argue that full QofE spend exceeds the deal risk — proof-of-cash bank tracing alone may suffice at the micro end of the market.

12 source episodes
Daniel Batista Barker Squire Jed Morris Brian Seeling Andrew Harbin Julia and Grant Hensel Julia Grant Hensel Don Gourley Scott Walton Joseph Ziolkowski Matt Railla Chandra Rao
16 ep
dd_questions_to_add

Ask: 'Who can replace the seller in the field, in customer relationships, and in institutional knowledge?' — and verify that person exists

Owner or founder dependency is consistently the most dangerous hidden risk in sub-$3M SDE businesses. Buyers report discovering post-close that customers called the seller's cell phone, that the sole senior technician was never interviewed, or that 'I'm the business' was the de facto answer to every operational question. Effective DD on this theme requires: (a) identifying every function the owner performs including evening calls and emergency dispatches, (b) interviewing the #2 or senior technician directly to gauge their independence and intention to stay, and (c) verifying that key customer relationships are with the company's systems, not the seller's personal relationships.

“The founder was in her late 70s. They never wanted to leave her. Half of their volume was coming from major retailers. As soon as I bought the business, I lost that customer.”

Caveat Several buyers succeeded despite heavy founder dependency by: (1) identifying and retaining a strong #2, (2) negotiating a long transition period with the seller, or (3) planning to be the operator themselves. Key person risk is manageable if the process or knowledge is teachable.

11 source episodes
Adam Goldberg Brian Seeling Dom Wells Matt Railla Andy Rougeot Dan Drake Mark Sinatra Fred McGill Nick Molina Scott Duncan Russ Hadlock
13 ep
dd_questions_to_add

Negotiate a normalized working capital peg in the LOI — cash calls at closing kill deals and destroy post-close momentum

Working capital surprises rank among the most common post-close shocks. Multiple buyers describe discovering that the seller had drawn down AR, that the business was seasonal and they closed at the cash-high point of the year, or that project-based businesses required fronting significant capital before receiving payment. The tactical lesson: (1) model working capital cycles using actual QuickBooks data early in diligence, (2) include a normalized working capital peg in the LOI with explicit language, (3) get lender pre-approval for working capital financing at close, and (4) bring more cash than you think you need. Several buyers describe negotiating 60-day post-close working capital periods that eliminated ambiguity.

“Working capital, working capital, working capital. That is such a big thing that searchers need to be aware of and really understand.”

Caveat Some self-funded buyers in simple service businesses (cleaning, pool service, landscaping) report that working capital complexity is minimal because cash collection is immediate and there is no major inventory. The issue scales with deal complexity and project-orientation of the business.

9 source episodes
Scott Walton Bradley Roofner and Logan Brown Dan Angel Nick Wheeler Chandra Rao Adrian Pinto Zack Mutnik Eric Calderon JD Hassley
13 ep
red_flags_ignored

Require the seller to carry at least 10% as a note — willingness to finance signals confidence; an unusually large note or refusal to finance at all signals something different

Seller financing appears across 13+ episodes with two opposite interpretations. A seller who refuses to finance any portion is widely cited as a red flag: it signals they don't trust the business to service debt, or that they want complete separation from future performance. Conversely, a seller offering an unusually large seller note with minimal cash down (e.g., 80-90% carry) can also signal urgency to unload a troubled business. The sweet spot: seller note of 10-20% indicates genuine alignment. Buyers used seller notes successfully as both a verification mechanism (seller skin in the game to fix misrepresentations) and as a deal-structuring tool when SBA financing fell short.

“I probably wouldn't have done a deal where the seller said, 'I'm not going to finance any of it.' Because that tells me they don't have confidence in the business.”

Caveat In high-fragmentation industries (audiology, veterinary, dental), sellers often don't finance because institutional buyers have normalized all-cash transactions. Absence of seller financing in these sectors is not automatically a red flag.

8 source episodes
Eric Donahue Dustin Fusillo Gat Caperton Chandra Rao Adam Markley Adam Ralph Chirag Shah Michael Heath
12 ep
red_flags_ignored

Revenue declining year-over-year without a clear thesis for reversal is a near-disqualifying red flag — turnarounds are a different business than acquisitions

Buyers who purchased businesses with persistent revenue decline — even at attractive multiples — consistently struggled post-close. The red flag is not just the decline, but the seller's inability to articulate a credible thesis for why a new owner would reverse it. Classic warning signs that recur: revenue down 3+ consecutive years without market explanation, flat revenue for 7+ years despite economic growth, declining customer count masked by price increases, and lifestyle-business seller who lost ambition. First-time buyers are particularly vulnerable because low purchase prices feel like a margin of safety. They rarely are.

“Declining business is a major red flag; even seller retention and restructuring cannot save a fundamentally declining operation.”

Caveat Deliberate turnaround strategies with clear operational levers — particularly in fragmented industries where the buyer has specific expertise — can succeed. The distinction is whether the decline is secular (structural) or operational (fixable). Brian Beers rehabilitated declining Midas units at a discount specifically because their distress made them unfinanceable by others.

9 source episodes
Ayo Phillips Adam Goldberg Zack Mutnik Dan Verboski Brett Kennedy Colin King Chad Fondriest John Schuler Jeff Felker
11 ep
dd_questions_to_add

Separate COVID lifts, PPP loans, and one-time add-backs from true run-rate SDE — request 5 years of financials, not just 3

A distinct sub-theme within financial verification: buyers who accepted post-COVID financials without normalizing for pandemic-specific distortions overpaid for peak earnings that were not sustainable. Common distortions include: PPP loans recorded as revenue, EIDL grants inflating cash, COVID-driven demand spikes in home services and e-commerce that reversed sharply in 2022-2023, and consumer discretionary slowdowns that post-COVID buyers misread as permanent trend lines. The tactical response: require 5 years of financials (pre-disruption through current) and model conservative run-rates using the 2019-2021 average, not the 2021-2022 peak.

“It was marketed as a little over 300K SDE. That ended up having a PPP loan kind of hidden in it, so it was closer to $250K.”

Caveat Some businesses with COVID spikes converted temporary demand into permanent market share through operational investments during the disruption. Blanket discounting of post-COVID financials can cause buyers to underbid on genuinely improved businesses — context matters.

9 source episodes
Andrew Harbin Joe Odell Justin Turner Joe Valley Adam Ralph Shell Zhang Scott Walton Chirag Shah Jesse Safir
10 ep
advice_to_first_time_buyer

Accept that your first deal will have 'hair' — analysis paralysis kills more searches than bad deals

One of the highest-frequency pieces of advice across the dataset: stop waiting for a clean deal. Nearly every memorable acquisition in the dataset had operational complexity, financial messiness, seller idiosyncrasies, or industry challenges that caused other buyers to pass. The advice is not to ignore red flags but to distinguish between manageable problems you can solve (owner-dependency in an teachable trade, messy QuickBooks that a good bookkeeper can clean) and structural problems you cannot (declining industry, fundamentally broken business model, dishonest seller). First-time buyers who waited for a clean deal consistently report extending searches by 12-18 months without improving deal quality.

“The most interesting deals we ever worked on were the ones that had a lot of hair on them — the ones that everyone had passed on.”

Caveat The 'hair is fine' advice applies to operational complexity, not financial dishonesty or structural decline. Several buyers learned the hard way that mistaking a broken business for a hairy one — especially in declining markets or with dishonest sellers — leads to painful outcomes.

9 source episodes
Chad Hildebrand Abhi Ravishankar Obby Robbie Shankar Chelsea Wood Adam Salmen Chris Jones Rob Carpenter Johannes Hock John Ikalowych
10 ep
advice_to_first_time_buyer

In year one: 'Do no harm.' Learn the business, preserve relationships, and resist the urge to remake it in your image

A clear consensus emerges from operators who succeeded in their first year versus those who struggled: buyers who immediately changed pricing, restructured teams, rebranded, or imposed new systems without understanding the business often damaged revenue, culture, and customer relationships. The tactical advice: spend 90-180 days learning before implementing changes, keep existing systems even if imperfect, resist telling employees 'I won't change anything' (false promise) but genuinely observe before acting, and use your first year to document SOPs and understand why things are done the way they are. Growth is a bonus in year one — not losing value is the goal.

“If the Hippocratic Oath applies to buying a business, the first principle is: do no harm. I'm quite pleased that in 2 years we've actually grown the top line.”

Caveat In turnaround acquisitions or businesses with obviously broken operations (e.g., absentee owner, poor culture, pricing below cost), immediate intervention is necessary. The 'do no harm' principle applies to healthy acquisitions — broken businesses require surgical disruption from day one.

8 source episodes
Doug Johns Jason Cline Peter Wild and Carlos Laconi Scott Crosby Matt O'Brien Paul Quirk Eric Hayes Taylor Mattingly
10 ep
dd_questions_to_add

Identify the 2-3 employees the business cannot lose, interview them independently, and lock in retention before close

Key employee risk appears in 10+ episodes as a primary post-close surprise. Buyers consistently report that the seller's characterization of their team — 'they'll all stay' — proved wrong when key technicians, managers, or relationship holders departed within 60-90 days of ownership change. Effective tactics: (1) identify every employee the business cannot operate without, including those not on the org chart, (2) meet them before close if possible to assess their attitude toward new ownership, (3) negotiate retention bonuses or employment agreements tied to the close, and (4) ask the seller directly about the #2 person and their succession intentions.

“Your first question after signing the NDA should be: who is the number two person, and are they capable of becoming number one?”

Caveat In some acquisitions, turnover among legacy employees is healthy and even necessary — especially in businesses with long-tenured underperformers or culture problems created by the previous owner. Adam Rao explicitly planned for rapid employee turnover as part of his transformation thesis.

9 source episodes
Brian Seeling Fred McGill Mark Sinatra Ken Eyjolfson Jack Carr Scott Duncan Sarah Chiles and Matthew Ferguson Nick Molina John Schuler
8 ep
dd_questions_to_add

Ask: 'When did you last raise prices, and by how much?' — flat pricing over 3+ years signals either complacency or an uncompetitive market

Pricing history is one of the highest-ROI DD questions rarely asked by first-time buyers. Multiple buyers discovered post-close that the previous owner had not raised prices in 3-7 years despite cost inflation, leaving significant margin on the table. This is both a risk (margins compressed by rising costs) and an opportunity (pricing power available to a new owner). Ask specifically: What is the pricing history for the past 5 years? Has pricing kept pace with labor and material cost increases? What is the customer's reaction history when prices were raised? Who are the top 3 customers and what do they pay per unit of service?

“Investigate pricing history to identify if prices have stagnated despite cost increases — this indicates untapped pricing power available to the new owner from day one.”

Caveat In some industries — particularly Medicaid-reimbursed home care, regulated utilities, and price-taker commodity markets — pricing is genuinely not in the seller's control. Flat pricing there reflects market structure, not management complacency.

8 source episodes
Joe Wynn Doug Johns Andrew Stordeur Russ Hadlock Michael Heath Matt O'Brien Jackson Jenna Whigham
6 ep
red_flags_ignored

If the seller refuses all pre-close employee and customer contact, treat it as a near-disqualifying red flag — something material is being hidden

While it's common for sellers to delay employee access until later in diligence to protect confidentiality, an outright refusal to permit any customer or employee contact before signing is cited as a major warning sign. Buyers who encountered this restriction and proceeded anyway often discovered material issues: customer relationships were personal to the seller, key employees were disengaged, or the seller was concealing operational problems. The tactical response: require at least reference conversations with 2-3 customers and a meeting with the #2 employee before completing due diligence. A seller with a legitimate business should be able to facilitate anonymous or structured reference calls.

“If a seller upfront tells you you're not going to be able to talk to a single employee, you're not going to be allowed to talk to a single customer — that is a significant red flag.”

Caveat In franchise contexts, the FDD provides independent franchisee lists that substitute for direct customer contact. In regulated industries (healthcare, defense), pre-close customer access may be genuinely restricted for compliance reasons — this is different from a seller hiding problems.

6 source episodes
Alex Mears Adam Goldberg Scott Duncan Matt Railla Christian Bateson Link Moser
Source library

Episode Index

All 374 episodes that fed the synthesis. Click any row to open the article on acquiringminds.co. Type to filter by guest, company, industry, geography, or background.

Showing all 374 episodes.

Guest Company Industry Search type Deal size
Abhi Ravishankar Truss One Partners (holding company) with pool service operating companies Pool service and maintenance independent-sponsor PP: ~$2.2-2.5 million (first acquisition) · SDE/EBITDA: 600k-700k (first business) · Rev: 3 million (first business); 8-9 million (portfolio run rate)
Adam Borcz Delta Installation Group commercial furniture installation self-funded SDE/EBITDA: $900,000 SDE at close; grew to $2.5M EBITDA
Adam Duggins New Page Capital structural steel fabrication and construction services self-funded Rev: 12 million (first deal at close)
Adam Goldberg Seracon candle manufacturing unknown PP: $600,000 ($300K goodwill + $300K working capital) · Rev: $1.2-1.3 million at acquisition
Adam Markley Prox Capital Group holding company with logistics, staffing, and services businesses self-funded SDE/EBITDA: seven figures (medical staffing)
Adam Ralph Showcraft Trade show exhibit production and services self-funded, later with investor funding PP: $1.22 million (refinanced to $780,000) · SDE/EBITDA: $350-400k EBITDA (rolling 3-5 year average including COVID); ~$550k SDE pre-COVID (2019 peak) · Rev: $4.9 million (2019 peak); $0 for 15 consecutive months due to COVID
Adam Ralph Triple20 (exhibit production - Showcraft + Display Arts) exhibit production and trade show booths self-funded PP: $1.2 million (Showcraft) + $750k (Display Arts) · SDE/EBITDA: ~$300-400k EBITDA · Rev: $4.9 million (pre-COVID), $3.8 million year 2
Adam Salmen UMECC (United Metallurgical Equipment Companies of Cincinnati) steel manufacturing equipment supplier traditional SDE/EBITDA: high single-digit millions · Rev: topline revenue between 25 and 50 million
Adam Vandermyde Petro West petroleum equipment distribution and installation self-funded PP: $4.5 million
Adrian Pinto Georgia Scapes commercial landscaping self-funded Rev: bit under 3 million
Adrian Pinto Georgia Scapes landscaping services traditional n/a
Aizik Zimmerman J Blanton (residential plumbing company) residential plumbing self-funded Rev: ~$6M at acquisition
AJ Wasserstein, Michael Horowitz, Peter Mistretta Knight Franchise Holdings (Mistretta), Wingstop restaurants (Horowitz) Chiropractic franchising / Quick-service restaurants other n/a
Alan Lochridge Stoneman residential hardscaping self-funded SDE/EBITDA: low 20% SDE in 2020 · Rev: 5.5 million
Alex Glasner WorkPays employability and skills training self-funded n/a
Alex Holley B-Dry Systems of Louisville / Ramjack of Louisville waterproofing and foundation repair self-funded PP: mid-three millions (not specified exactly) · SDE/EBITDA: north of $800K · Rev: north of $4.5 million (5-year rolling average)
Alex Mears Brydon Group search accelerator / search fund support independent-sponsor n/a
Alex Michael Wallaroo Wallets e-commerce accessories (phone wallets) self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 180k (at time of purchase) · Rev: 650k at purchase; 875k in subsequent year
Alex Michael Wallaroo e-commerce/amazon FBA (phone wallets) traditional PP: 675000
Alicia Miller Sylvan Learning tutoring and educational services for K-12 students independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: $1.1 million
Alicia Powers Design-build general contractor (established 1993) residential design-build general contracting other PP: $750,000 · SDE/EBITDA: $250,000 · Rev: $1.6-2 million (3-year average)
Amir Haboosheh Snowball Industries home services trades (HVAC, plumbing, electrical, roofing, garage doors, pool service, landscaping) independent-sponsor n/a
Andrew Blazenko Eterna, ProSafe First Aid Training, TrueFoam education training, expanded polystyrene manufacturing independent-sponsor PP: ProSafe: $950,000; TrueFoam: $19M (business) + $22M (property) · SDE/EBITDA: ProSafe: $310,000; TrueFoam: $8M total ($6M business + $2M rental income) · Rev: ProSafe: ~$1.2M; TrueFoam: $32M
Andrew Harbin Venango Awning residential awning services self-funded PP: $750k range (3x SDE) · SDE/EBITDA: ~$250k-300k (with hidden PPP loan) · Rev: ~$1 million
Andrew Hitchings Olive Ridge Partners / Colorado Home Cooling home services - whole house fans, skylights, electrical contracting self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 250k
Andrew Kurszrock Hopewell Sheet Metal Manufacturing custom ductwork fabrication self-funded n/a
Andrew Sieve Restaurant business (northeast Minneapolis location) restaurant self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 1-3 million · Rev: 1+ million
Andrew Stordeur All Things Cedar outdoor furniture manufacturing - redwood cedar traditional PP: approximately 2.8 million (4x EBITDA on 700k EBITDA, includes ~1 million real estate) · SDE/EBITDA: 700,000 · Rev: 3,000,000
Andrew Swiler Lanteria SaaS self-funded Rev: less than 2 million
Andy Rougeot RG Maintenance self-storage maintenance and gate/access control systems self-funded SDE/EBITDA: $725k · Rev: $2.5 million
Anika John Digipod print-on-demand self-publishing self-funded Rev: around five million
Anne Ristic Agency Employment Services HR services, staffing, compliance, and PEO self-funded n/a
Anya Aliev Life Support Systems AED services and maintenance traditional Rev: single digit millions at close, doubled in 18 months
August Felker-Oberle Risk Strategies (formerly Overly Risk Strategies), Murphy's Insurance Group commercial insurance brokerage traditional | self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 1.7M EBITDA
Austin Smoak Grove Oaks Capital residential roofing self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 3 million dollars
Avery Tomek FedEx route(s) courier/last-mile delivery self-funded PP: ~$1 million · SDE/EBITDA: $200,000 · Rev: $1.1 million annually
Ayo Phillips property management / maintenance services self-funded n/a
Barker Squire Craneworks government contracting and crane servicing self-funded SDE/EBITDA: sold for about 4X multiple, lower half of $500K-$1.5M EBITDA range · Rev: estimated $2.5M-$5M based on 11-12 employees and revenue per employee
Ben Bortner Bortner's Pool pool cleaning and maintenance self-funded n/a
Ben Brier Meyer Gage precision gauge manufacturing (custom/handmade) self-funded Rev: 3.5-4 million
Ben Jasper Plastic bag manufacturer (specific name not disclosed) plastic bag manufacturing - specialty bags (pharmaceutical, food, auto) self-funded PP: mid threes (millions) · SDE/EBITDA: low threes
Ben Jasper Plastic bag manufacturer plastic bag manufacturing self-funded PP: mid threes · SDE/EBITDA: approximately 1 million · Rev: mid-seven figures
Ben Rizzo Hadfield elevator servicing self-funded n/a
Bradley Roofner and Logan Brown WLE (landscaping business) landscaping services independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: adjusted EBITDA approximately $1.7-2 million at time of acquisition · Rev: 8 million (at purchase), 16 million (at exit)
Brandon Laughridge North Terrace Property Management property management / scattered-site multifamily self-funded Rev: 1.5 million (at acquisition)
Brendan Van Buren Pro-Max Fence Systems commercial fencing traditional SDE/EBITDA: $2 million · Rev: $12-13 million
Brett Kennedy Furniture Taxi moving and hauling services self-funded PP: $200,000 · Rev: $112,000
Brett Maxam MorCrete Construction residential concrete flatwork construction self-funded Rev: mid 3 million to 4 million
Brian Anderson Deco Manufacturing manufacturing self-funded n/a
Brian Beers Midas (multi-unit franchisee) automotive repair and maintenance independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: ~10% EBITDA margin · Rev: $36 million
Brian Hartman Northside Tree residential tree care self-funded PP: 2.5 million · SDE/EBITDA: 650,000 · Rev: 2.6 million
Brian Lee Shields Shields Hill Co property management independent-sponsor n/a
Brian Seeling PGM (Progressive Global Maintenance) commercial kitchen equipment repair and maintenance traditional PP: 1.64 million · SDE/EBITDA: just above half a million (approximately 500k+) · Rev: 2.6 million
Brittney Orellano Radio Controlled Garage Door & Gate garage doors and gates installation and servicing self-funded n/a
Bruce Vann Lux Out Products stage curtain and drapery manufacturing self-funded n/a
Bryan Houck Extra Credit Projects creative advertising agency self-funded n/a
Burke Adams PC Enclosures metal enclosures manufacturing traditional PP: 2.3 million
Carlo Santelli Triem Industries custom metal fasteners and screws manufacturing proprietary PP: $16 million · SDE/EBITDA: $3.5 million · Rev: $13 million
Carlos Santelli Trium Industries & Stillwater Fasteners custom metal components and fasteners manufacturing independent-sponsor PP: $5.25 million (after sale-leaseback of real estate) · SDE/EBITDA: $3.5 million · Rev: $13 million
Caroline Chapdelaine North Star Photonics defense photonics / fiber optic gyroscopes independent-sponsor PP: $600k upfront + $1M earnout over 3 years · SDE/EBITDA: $300k · Rev: $2M
Cassie Niekamp, Morli Desai, Anne Ristic Fencing company (Cassie); Rental/equipment business (Morli) Fencing installation and residential construction services self-funded Rev: ~$700,000
Chad Fondriest Darby Creek Trading e-commerce luxury faux floral arrangements and home decor self-funded PP: $130,000 · SDE/EBITDA: $3,284 SDE (2017) · Rev: $137,826 (2017); grown to $4 million
Chad Hildebrand A Candle Co candle manufacturing (private label) self-funded PP: approximately $3M+ (including property)
Chandler Reed Get Green NOI (formerly Onyx Energy) commercial lighting contracting independent-sponsor PP: 625000 · SDE/EBITDA: 900000 revenue at acquisition (barely profitable); 15% net margin at peak · Rev: 900000 at acquisition; 6000000 at peak
Chandra Rao Miller Companies electrical construction & fiber networks self-funded PP: $300,000-$600,000 per deal · SDE/EBITDA: $3 million · Rev: $12 million
Chase Murdoch Decada Group luxury retail and small business holding company self-funded n/a
Chelsea Wood Acquisition Lab Acquisition education / program management unknown n/a
Chirag Shah Sit Means Sit dog training franchise traditional PP: $1.71M · SDE/EBITDA: ~$550K average (based on 2019-2021 data) · Rev: ~$1.95M (2021), ~$1.7-1.8M (2019-2020)
Chris Edwards Affordable Flooring Warehouse flooring retail and installation services self-funded PP: $1.7 million · SDE/EBITDA: grew from $500k to $1.1 million · Rev: grew from $3 million to $4.5 million
Chris Frederick Empowered Ventures (ESOP-owned holdco, TVF textile distribution) textile and fabric distribution other Rev: TVF approximately $50 million; scrap metal division over $100 million
Chris Jones Foundation repair business (name not disclosed in transcript) foundation repair construction self-funded n/a
Chris Koerner Bitcoin Mining Syndicate / Mining Facility Operator cryptocurrency mining other PP: 750,000
Chris Williams System Six bookkeeping and financial back office services self-funded SDE/EBITDA: ~$1M at close · Rev: $2.5M at close, now $3.6-3.7M
Christian Bateson Resolute Services construction cleaning self-funded PP: 1.5 million · SDE/EBITDA: ~200,000-250,000 · Rev: 800,000
Christiana Laugen pool maintenance and repair business pool maintenance and repair self-funded n/a
Christine Traylor Swann House hospitality - bed and breakfast unknown PP: $7.5 million · SDE/EBITDA: $700,000
Christy Loucks Revenue Accelerator digital B2B sales outsourcing/cold outreach independent-sponsor PP: 2.75 million CAD (~2 million USD) · SDE/EBITDA: ~550,000 USD (2021-2022 SDE) · Rev: 1.4 million CAD (~1 million USD) 2022 revenue
Clayton Collins Housing Wire B2B media and information services self-funded SDE/EBITDA: ~$1.6 million (40% EBITDA margin on $4M revenue) · Rev: $4 million
Cliff Nelson and Christine Nelson psychogeriatric services business senior care and psychogeriatric services self-funded n/a
Clint Fiore Texas Business Buyers business brokerage unknown PP: $500K to $15 million
Cody Agee Sierra Dairy Laboratory food safety and testing self-funded Rev: ~None person company
Colin Gates Mastercraft Coatings coatings manufacturing traditional n/a
Colin King Circle City Capital Group / USA Brands diversified holding company - apparel and soft goods manufacturing and distribution self-funded PP: $25 million · Rev: 10 million
Connor Pera The Print Authority commercial printing self-funded n/a
Corey Mullins Cool by Design HVAC unknown Rev: less than $200,000
Corey Robinson Batteries Plus automotive battery and service retail franchise traditional PP: four locations · SDE/EBITDA: 490k SDE across six locations · Rev: 2.3 million top line
Corey Veverka TBS pharmaceutical manufacturing validation consulting self-funded Rev: 6-6.5 million annually at time of acquisition
Damon Clarkson Pacific Insulation Supply online wholesale distribution of insulation traditional PP: 1.1 million · SDE/EBITDA: 250 to 275k (2022) · Rev: 1.7 million (2022)
Dan Angel Lodging Source corporate travel management self-funded n/a
Dan Burnside Parker Mechanical HVAC contracting traditional SDE/EBITDA: about 800k · Rev: about 2.1 million
Dan Drake Industrial Applied Electric MRO industrial electrical supply / heavy equipment components self-funded PP: $2,050,000 · SDE/EBITDA: $230,000
Dan Tagliatella Stutz Driveway Cleaning driveway cleaning services self-funded n/a
Dan Verboski Leon's Signs Sign manufacturing and installation network PP: 1.6-1.7 million · SDE/EBITDA: 650,000 · Rev: 2.7 million
Daniel Batista Candyland Kids (Downey location) indoor family entertainment center self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 900k
Danielle Ny Decorus Home Staging home staging self-funded n/a
Danny Fields and Steve Reis Holland Supply Company natural gas and propane distribution traditional PP: 3.3 million · SDE/EBITDA: 750k TTM at closing (up from 700k signing)
Darryl Lindie AA Thrifty Sign and Awning sign and awning manufacturing and installation self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 645000
Dave Gilbert Proven (formerly Proven CFO) fractional CFO services self-funded PP: 2.8 million · SDE/EBITDA: 750,000 · Rev: 2.1 million
David Graff Danhard light manufacturing - HVAC systems self-funded PP: $5 million · Rev: 40% TTM growth
David Page Post and Trellis wines and vines - residential vineyard management and winery operations self-funded Rev: approximately $1 million to low millions at time of acquisition
Derek Croft Lice Doctors lice treatment services independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: $1 million · Rev: $3 million
Derek Turner Roll A Shield pavement management engineering services traditional SDE/EBITDA: a little north of one million · Rev: around 5 million
Devin Fitzgerald RML Service Group home healthcare self-funded PP: 600000 · Rev: 1000000
Dom Wells Onfolio online course acquisition and operations other n/a
Dominic Blue Blue Air / ASAP Pure Air air duct cleaning / HVAC services traditional PP: approximately $1.1M · SDE/EBITDA: ~$445k · Rev: ~$2M
Don Gourley Boston Tree Preservation tree preservation services self-funded n/a
Don Grigg Big Adventures (kayak company) plastics manufacturing and molding self-funded n/a
Doug Johns Mr. Rooter Plumbing plumbing franchise self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 1.8 million · Rev: 8.8 million trailing 12m
Doug Lepisto Sleeping Giant Capital place-based private equity and search fund accelerator independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: 50 to 100 million in EBITDA size · Rev: 90 to 100 million in total portfolio revenue
Dustin Fusillo NextATM ATM parts and servicing self-funded PP: under a million dollars · Rev: low seven figures
Dustin Kion COI Holdings Electronic components distribution and industrial manufacturing self-funded Rev: $20 million
Eddie Zakes Earth Development landscaping, snow removal, and outdoor services brokerage traditional n/a
Edward McDonald Botanical Designs interior plant design and maintenance services traditional Rev: ~$11 million
Elliott Edge Velonex Technologies (formerly Palmer Technology Solutions) Managed IT services (MSP) self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 700k · Rev: just under 2 million
Enrique Rodriguez Mac General, Inc. project-based electrical contracting self-funded PP: $450,000
Eric Bauer Turner Hat hat manufacturing unknown n/a
Eric Calderon TX Partners / LK Industries Niche manufacturing and testing/inspection/calibration traditional SDE/EBITDA: 25% EBITDA margin · Rev: Between $6-7 million
Eric Donahue Peninsula Paving paving and road construction self-funded PP: approximately $3 to $3.5 million · SDE/EBITDA: SDE ~$700k, adjusted EBITDA ~$500k · Rev: $4.1 million (3-year average)
Eric Hayes Rocky Mountain Reclamation Heavy civil/site remediation independent-sponsor PP: little below a four times multiple · SDE/EBITDA: 20% · Rev: 7 million dollars
Evan Stewart Direct One direct mail marketing unknown SDE/EBITDA: 1.8 million · Rev: 34 million
Felipe Corcuera Beecker process automation software independent-sponsor n/a
Francisco del Rio, Diego Silva Prieto LatamVet veterinary clinic roll-up self-funded n/a
Fraser Voll Regional Janitorial Services commercial cleaning self-funded SDE/EBITDA: high six figures
Fred McGill Bray Electrical residential electrical contracting self-funded n/a
Gabe Perez and Kristen Perez Walk-in cooler and freezer construction company Commercial construction - refrigerated structures assembly traditional PP: 4.2x SDE multiple · SDE/EBITDA: approximately $1 million
Gabe Perez and Kristen Perez Refrigerated Structures of New England refrigerated structures / commercial construction traditional SDE/EBITDA: approximately 1+ million SDE
Gail Hamilton Azodo Real Hearing USA audiology practices independent-sponsor Rev: mid7 figures
Gail Hamilton Azoto Audiology practices (portfolio) hearing and audiology services self-funded PP: range from low 3s to low 7 figures · Rev: mid 7 figures in aggregate portfolio revenue
Gantt Elmore, Matt Moldenhauer Elmore Companies family office and SMB acquisition holding company independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: 3 million (Bellwether Forest Products peak EBITDA) · Rev: over 500 million (Elmore Companies portfolio)
Garrison Snell Snell Ventures Heavy manufacturing and financial services self-funded PP: 1.9 million (combined two acquisitions in 2020) · Rev: 1.4 to 1.8 million initial revenue across acquisitions
Garth Fasano Top Dog Sales Center outsourced sales and customer service operations for dog training and pet services self-funded Rev: $2 million (2021 basis)
Gat Caperton Seely Furniture (Gat Creek) furniture manufacturing self-funded PP: book value deal · SDE/EBITDA: 5.5x EBIT multiple · Rev: $10 million
George Goates RTW Management passenger transportation / shuttle and bus services traditional PP: two and a half million dollars · SDE/EBITDA: four times earnings · Rev: two and a half million
George Tibil and Keith Fields ServiceMaster franchise commercial janitorial cleaning self-funded Rev: 1.5 million
George Vallone Nuvelds (restructured to apartment turnover services) apartment turnover services self-funded Rev: 1.1 million at acquisition
Grania Michel Associated Photo and Imaging large format commercial printing and light manufacturing self-funded PP: $3.5 million
Greg Bruns Allied Hydromulch Hydromulching and erosion control self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 350,000 to 400,000 · Rev: 1,150,000
Greg Geronimous and Robert Graham Entrepreneurship through acquisition traditional | self-funded | debate n/a
Greg Hirsch Independent Window Distributor window distribution self-funded Rev: 25+ million
Gretchen Roberts Red Bike Advisors tax accounting and financial advisory self-funded Rev: between $1.5 and $3 million
Harley Sitner Peace Vans specialty automotive repair and retail self-funded n/a
Heather Shattuck Heidorn The Tailored Closet (Yarmouth, Maine) custom closet design and installation traditional SDE/EBITDA: 250 to 350, 400 · Rev: 1.1 to 1.2 million
Iris LaVine The Porch Company design and build unknown PP: $6 million
Jack Carr Rapid Response residential HVAC service self-funded PP: $620,000-$640,000 · SDE/EBITDA: $200,000+ · Rev: $780,000
Jack Foster, Jake McLaughlin Meineke (franchisee roll-up) automotive repair franchising independent-sponsor Rev: ~$1 million per location store-level revenue
Jack McCarthy Gold Leaf Farming specialty crop farming (almonds, pistachios, mulberries) other n/a
Jack Saville Strategic Fence commercial fencing self-funded n/a
Jackson Cowgirl Kitchen and Pizza by the Sea Nostalgic restaurant operations self-funded SDE/EBITDA: around $500k for Cowgirl · Rev: between $1.5 million and $2.5 million
Jacob Lee Scenthound dog wellness franchising independent-sponsor n/a
Jacob Voswinkel Floors Galore commercial flooring self-funded SDE/EBITDA: SDE target range of 750 to 1.5 million
Jaime Arias Patients4You lead generation for emergency dental self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 150000
Jake Bittner Qlarion government data analytics other PP: 660k-700k · Rev: 2-4 million at acquisition; 20+ million at exit
James Bloom Excel Mechanical Contractors commercial HVAC and plumbing self-funded PP: $785,000 · SDE/EBITDA: $340,000
James Bohannon Belzberg and Co. family office investment unknown n/a
James Maxwell Commercial janitorial cleaning business commercial janitorial cleaning self-funded PP: 1.8 million · SDE/EBITDA: 500,000 - 600,000 · Rev: 1.5 million
James Temple Mathnasium math tutoring and learning centers franchise acquisition Rev: under $100,000 (last 12 months at acquisition)
Jared Benof Parents' destination wedding travel agency (acquired) Destination wedding travel agency unknown SDE/EBITDA: 950000 · Rev: 8000000
Jared Benoff Vacationeeze travel agency self-funded PP: $8 million · Rev: $8 million
Jared Pierce Mercurious (Olympic Holdings) home services self-funded PP: $26 million · SDE/EBITDA: $3 million EBITDA · Rev: $4 million
Jarett Berke Lou's Restaurant and Bakery restaurant and bakery self-funded Rev: approximately $1 million daily revenue
Jason Andrews GroupSource healthcare group purchasing organization traditional Rev: 280-300 million in spend
Jason Cline Kauai Isle Flowers flower distribution self-funded SDE/EBITDA: approximately $250,000 · Rev: slightly over $1,000,000
Jason Jackson Futaleufu Partners (dental practice management) dental practice management traditional Rev: $7 million revenue
JD Beck Mountain Valley Plumbing and HVAC plumbing and HVAC services self-funded PP: $800,000 · Rev: $1.2 million
JD Hassley Uptown Frame custom framing self-funded PP: $645,000 · SDE/EBITDA: $245,000 · Rev: $600,000
Jed Morris defense software/services self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 500k
Jeff Felker Retro 51 pen manufacturing self-funded Rev: 2.5 million
Jeff Flannery Hand and Stone Massage and Facial Spa massage and spa services independent-sponsor PP: $150,000
Jeff Homer Ensemble Music and dance education schools self-funded PP: high twos just below three times · Rev: $500,000
Jeff Horn Benchmark Xerox dealership / document management equipment and services self-funded SDE/EBITDA: ~$1 million · Rev: ~$5-6 million
Jenna Whigham Abound Health home care services for IDD and pediatric populations traditional PP: $100 million · SDE/EBITDA: $10 million EBITDA · Rev: 55-60 million
Jens Gründo Dovo straight razor manufacturing independent-sponsor n/a
Jeremy Hunka Summit Cabinet Coatings industrial coatings self-funded SDE/EBITDA: mid 6 figures / half a million · Rev: 2 million
Jerham Wren Vanlife Outfitters e-commerce retail (van parts and accessories) self-funded SDE/EBITDA: over $1 million (came down significantly)
Jerome Bouillon Visiting Angels (Asheville & Lenoir, NC franchises) home care self-funded Rev: half a million dollars
Jesse Safir ABG Print commercial printing self-funded SDE/EBITDA: approximately 1.3 million · Rev: 3.5 to 4 million
Jesse Sunquist self-funded n/a
Jesse Sunquist Mosquito Joe (franchise territory) outdoor mosquito and pest control services self-funded SDE/EBITDA: >300k · Rev: <$1 million
Jesus Wong Gear Restore high-end clothing repair and restoration services traditional SDE/EBITDA: close to $1 million CAD
Joe Odell Pharmacy Specialists home infusion pharmacy compounding traditional PP: $26 million · SDE/EBITDA: $4 million · Rev: $20 million
Joe Soelberg DFW Turf Solutions artificial turf installation self-funded SDE/EBITDA: upper end of 3.5-4.5x range · Rev: just over $5 million
Joe Springsteen Mallard Systems Outdoor cleaning and maintenance of commercial buildings self-funded PP: 1.475 million · SDE/EBITDA: 3.2x EBITDA based on 2023, trailing 12 to May 2024 shows 3.8 million revenue · Rev: 3.2 million (2023), trending to 3.8 million (2024)
Joe Valley Quiet Light Brokerage digital business brokerage unknown n/a
Joe Wechsler Blueline Ventures home care self-funded PP: 1 million dollars · Rev: 4 million
Joe Wynn Surgical specialties equipment service and distribution medical device distribution and surgical equipment service self-funded PP: 1.35 million · SDE/EBITDA: 889k · Rev: 2 million
Johannes Hock DFW Turf Solutions artificial turf installation and maintenance self-funded n/a
John Hubbard Express Custom Trailers trailer manufacturing self-funded PP: $2.5 million · SDE/EBITDA: $741k · Rev: $5.5 million
John Ikalowych HailCo automotive hail repair and roof damage remediation self-funded SDE/EBITDA: ~$2 million
John Mahoney Bailey Heating and Air HVAC self-funded PP: $1 million
John Murphy Commercial painting company commercial painting and industrial coating self-funded PP: approximately 2.3 million · SDE/EBITDA: 1 million · Rev: 8 million
John Schuler appliance repair company residential appliance repair unknown SDE/EBITDA: between 200 and 250 · Rev: 1.2 million
John Wilson The Wilson Companies plumbing and HVAC services self-funded Rev: $1 million
Jonathan Bournigal Bunker document storage traditional SDE/EBITDA: below $1 million · Rev: $2 million
Jonathan Taylor AEK Technology aerospace and defense manufacturing distribution self-funded n/a
Jonathan Tupper JSI - JOBE Services Inc asset-based lending and factoring self-funded Rev: $30 million in purchases a year
Jordan Carter BNA (B/A Search Investment Group partnership) grant research, grant writing, and grant administration self-funded SDE/EBITDA: $1 million EBITDA (40% margins on ~2.4-2.5 million revenue at close) · Rev: 2.4-2.5 million
Jordan Dubin Guild Garage Group garage door repair self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 30 million · Rev: 200 million
Jordan Evans Language Network language translation services self-funded Rev: $700,000
Jordan Novgrod LT Engineering (metal fabrication) metal fabrication and machining self-funded n/a
Joseph Cruz AA Equipment Supply construction supply, sewer and water infrastructure self-funded PP: 536,000 · SDE/EBITDA: 270,000 (marketed SDE) · Rev: 1.2 million
Joseph Ziolkowski Water damage restoration franchise (2 corporate-owned territories) Water damage restoration and remediation traditional PP: $515,000 · SDE/EBITDA: $350,000-400,000 (conservatively estimated, corporate stated ~$500,000 SDE) · Rev: $1,600,000-1,700,000 (combined for both territories)
Josh Key Plumbing business (Fort Worth) Commercial plumbing self-funded PP: 1.4 million · SDE/EBITDA: ~400k · Rev: 1.1-1.25 million
Josh Meadow Mercury healthcare logistics self-funded Rev: tens of millions
Juan Aguilar door business construction materials distribution self-funded n/a
Judd Lorson Third-party debt collection business (HOA/Condo assessments) Debt collection - HOA and condo assessments accelerator-backed Rev: $5 million
Jules Brenner American Sheet Metal sheet metal manufacturing self-funded n/a
Julia and Grant Hensel Nonprofit marketing agency (Google Grants management) digital marketing for nonprofits self-funded Rev: $2 million
Julia Grant Hensel Nonprofit Megaphone nonprofit marketing agency self-funded SDE/EBITDA: $300,000 · Rev: $2,000,000
Julie Hottinger, Janna Hottinger Signature Woodworking commercial cabinet and millwork manufacturing self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 750000 · Rev: 2100000
Justin Escajeda Escajeda Holdings construction trades and general contracting self-funded Rev: 50-100 million (portfolio)
Justin Turner Traction Capital Partners diversified hold-co (disaster restoration, paving, fire equipment supply, tools, mattress) independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: 1-5 million range per deal · Rev: 10.5-37 million per business
Justin Willess Construction business (data center focused) and janitorial services construction general contracting self-funded PP: $8.5 million
Justus Luttig Copeland Home Services and First American Plumbing HVAC and plumbing services traditional PP: just over 8 million · SDE/EBITDA: 8 million and 1.5 million EBITDA (proforma)
Karl Hughes Podcast production agency Podcast production services traditional SDE/EBITDA: 125K SDE · Rev: 300K+
Katherine Dines, Rahul Desai Women Travel Abroad women-focused tour operator for small group travel self-funded SDE/EBITDA: under 300,000 · Rev: approximately 800,000
Kaustubh Deo Blooma Tree Experts tree services - residential and commercial arboriculture self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 15-20% EBITDA margins, higher than that expected · Rev: ~2 million
Keegan Dum egenuity on-premise software for automotive and car wash traditional SDE/EBITDA: roughly $1 million EBT
Kelsey Lehrich 365 Holdings e-commerce DTC holding company self-funded Rev: multiple eight figures
Ken Eyjolfson Mr. Liquidator (mattress retailer) mattress retail traditional PP: $850,000 · SDE/EBITDA: $500,000 · Rev: $1.9 million
Ken Seio Lights On Digital digital marketing / home services staffing self-funded n/a
Kevin Bibelhausen Heritage Fabrics textiles and fabrics independent-sponsor n/a
Kevin Moyer Golden Home Access home accessibility for seniors unknown SDE/EBITDA: quarter million dollars in SDE · Rev: million dollars
Kevin Ramsier Sire Capital Partners financial advisory services independent-sponsor PP: above 25 million
Kevin Swenson appraisal management roll-up residential real estate appraisal self-funded PP: 2.5 million · SDE/EBITDA: 650-700 · Rev: just under 3 million
Kinza Azmat WTA Realty apartment locating and real estate brokerage self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 750 to 1.2 million (sweet spot estimate)
Kirk Olsson Mike's Fencing residential and commercial fencing contractor self-funded PP: 2.3 million · SDE/EBITDA: 600,000 · Rev: 2 million
Kyle Boyden and Jake Furfaro Rainier Cleaning Solutions commercial cleaning and home services independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: just shy of 1 million · Rev: just shy of 5 million
Kyle Paul GetOut (merger of Get Out Pass and Pogo Pass) leisure and entertainment pass subscriptions independent-sponsor Rev: 10 million to 100 million
Landon Mance Nevada Tree Service tree service traditional SDE/EBITDA: 600,000 · Rev: 1.1-1.2 million
Lindsay Buckheit, Kevin Black Media buying advertising agency (San Antonio), Residential outdoor design and build (Austin) digital advertising / media buying, residential outdoor construction design and build independent-sponsor PP: 1.6 million (media agency), undisclosed (design and build) · SDE/EBITDA: 575,000 (media agency) · Rev: 1.2 million (media agency, 2023)
Ling Van Deibel, Leo Van Deibel Infrastructure Design Solutions engineering consultancy / critical infrastructure design self-funded Rev: between 1 to 2 million pounds
Linh Tran Advanced Commercial Group / Apex Fund commercial refrigeration and trades services self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 300,000 in initial revenue, ~150,000-300,000 in actual SDE at purchase · Rev: 300,000
Link Moser Windhill Design web hosting and digital marketing agency self-funded SDE/EBITDA: $124,000
Lucas Phillips Newark Auto vintage auto replacement carpeting and mats self-funded PP: just under $1 million · SDE/EBITDA: just under $300,000 in SDE · Rev: just under $1.25 million
Luis Aguilar CYS Linen commercial linen rental self-funded PP: 7.5 million · SDE/EBITDA: 1.5 million · Rev: 5 million+
Luis Reyes Iberian Ventures (IBV) business services consolidation / fire safety self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 8 million EBITDA
Manny Saxena street sweeping / sanitation services traditional n/a
Marc Nzojibwami ABL Imaging large format print and sign shop traditional Rev: approximately 1-1.5 million
Marci Larouech Seay CHR (Central HR or C Management) HR consulting self-funded PP: mid-six figures · SDE/EBITDA: little over $250,000 SDE (six figure range) · Rev: little under $1 million
Mark Anderegg Little Sprouts childcare/daycare traditional SDE/EBITDA: approaching two of EBITDA · Rev: $17 million
Mark Andergg Little Sprouts childcare/early education traditional SDE/EBITDA: approaching $2 million · Rev: $17 million
Mark Olivito Paverart concrete paver customization and installation self-funded SDE/EBITDA: $100,000
Mark Sinatra Staff One HR / Aspen HR Outsourced HR services (PEO) traditional n/a
Martin Bispels Upper Park Disc Golf Direct-to-consumer e-commerce disc golf equipment manufacturing self-funded n/a
Marvin Karlow Raincatcher industrial powder coating self-funded PP: $2.1 million · SDE/EBITDA: $700,000 trailing 36 months EBITDA · Rev: $2 million
Matt Barnes Professional Touch Laundry Service commercial laundry service self-funded n/a
Matt Bauer and Chris Hartman American Scale Company scale servicing and distribution self-funded SDE/EBITDA: ~1.5 million (underwritten) · Rev: $5 million (aggregate)
Matt Brunnig Sunrise Yacht Products Niche manufacturing - sailing catamaran tension nets traditional SDE/EBITDA: 170-200K · Rev: 670000
Matt Durniak DHS Equipment B2B e-commerce parts for construction equipment self-funded PP: ~2 million · SDE/EBITDA: ~500k at acquisition · Rev: ~3.5 million at acquisition
Matt Huggins Peak Group Companies water infrastructure and equipment services independent-sponsor PP: 1.6 million dollars · Rev: 20 million dollars projected annual revenue
Matt Jackson Urethane Systems commercial spray foam and coating roofing self-funded n/a
Matt Kopp Enduring school laboratory supplies independent-sponsor PP: $7 million · SDE/EBITDA: $350k SDE · Rev: $5 million
Matt O'Brien Professional Fence commercial fencing independent-sponsor PP: approximately $6M based on 2.4x SDE multiple on $2.5M revenue and $625K EBITDA · SDE/EBITDA: $550K-$700K EBITDA, 24% margins · Rev: $2.4M-$2.7M annually (consistent)
Matt Orley Red Cottage vacation rental property management unknown SDE/EBITDA: mid-6figure EBITDA · Rev: north of a million bucks
Matt Orley Red Cottage vacation property management self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 4x SDE · Rev: north of a million bucks in revenue
Matt Railla Top Termite (termite inspection business) pest control - termite inspection traditional SDE/EBITDA: 450,000 to 500,000
Matthew Pohl Rewild Group (welding business) commercial industrial welding unknown Rev: close to $1 million
Matthew Saskin East Coast Towing Towing services self-funded n/a
Maurice Thomas Main Line Electrical electrical contracting traditional SDE/EBITDA: $750,000 to $1 million range
Meredith Schlinker and Michael Schlinker Background Connect employment screening services self-funded n/a
Michael Arrieta Garden City Companies blue collar and white collar service companies traditional SDE/EBITDA: over 3 million EBITDA (Connects IT deployment department)
Michael Davidov American United Home Care pediatric home health care self-funded SDE/EBITDA: ~$1M · Rev: $6M
Michael Dey American Spray Technologies Industrial spray pump manufacturing self-funded SDE/EBITDA: $500,000 · Rev: $3 million
Michael Heath Stateline Products, Pool King, Florida Pool garage door installation and pool maintenance services traditional PP: $250,000 (garage door); Pool King and Florida Pool prices not explicitly stated · SDE/EBITDA: SDE $250,000 (garage door at acquisition) · Rev: $2.5 million (garage door at 2020 acquisition); $7 million+ (garage door by 2023); $5 million (Pool King); $1.4 million (Florida Pool)
Michael Horowitz Wingstop quick service restaurant franchising independent-sponsor n/a
Michael Jacobson French Florist Florist retail / floral design self-funded Rev: $600k
Michael Johnson SpeedPro Raleigh Northwest printing services self-funded PP: 1.2 million · SDE/EBITDA: 480k · Rev: 1.1 million
Michael Kelker Timberline Pallet pallet manufacturing self-funded n/a
Michael Young Small accounting firm accounting self-funded n/a
Mike Okhravi Epoxy coating and towing companies garage flooring coatings and towing services self-funded Rev: ~$1 million
Mitchell Sorkin ATM route business / Stack Influence ATM routes and machines self-funded PP: $30K, $45K routes; $225K vending deal (failed) · Rev: $3,200-$3,600/month per route
Monte Markham Filta commercial kitchen cleaning and deep fryer filtration self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 400k+
Morgan McCaulay BrightStar Care home care services self-funded n/a
Morgan McCauley Helios Home Health home care independent-sponsor n/a
Morli Desai Amira Natural Skin Care e-commerce natural skincare independent-sponsor PP: 3.6 million · SDE/EBITDA: 1 million in SDE · Rev: 4 million
Nathan Gregory Autobody News B2B trade media - automotive collision repair traditional n/a
Naveen Vinta Bailey Specialty Cranes specialty manufacturing / aerial work platforms self-funded n/a
Neil Finneran Mosquito Joe pest control / mosquito spraying other Rev: less than 700 thousand in 2022
Nicholas James KS Heating and Air HVAC independent-sponsor Rev: 17-18 million
Nick Akers STL Communications managed service provider (MSP) independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: 2-5 million
Nick Haschka and Dylan Ferguson Onpoint Generators Generator dealers and servicers self-funded SDE/EBITDA: a couple million shy of three million top line, mid six figures SDE · Rev: a couple million shy of three million
Nick Huber Somewhere.com (formerly Support Shepherd) business process outsourcing independent-sponsor PP: $47 million enterprise value · Rev: Over 100 million a year of revenue potential
Nick Keegan Mail Metrics customer communications platform / digital mail unknown n/a
Nick Molina Kleinman Property Management property management self-funded SDE/EBITDA: $1-2 million SDE
Nick Munsee Hales Engineering traffic engineering and transportation consulting self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 1 million to 1.5 million annually · Rev: lower to mid seven figures (2-3 million)
Nick Patrick Wedding catering company and wedding venue Wedding catering and venue events self-funded PP: $400,000 · Rev: approximately $1 million at close
Nick Wheeler Commercial landscaping business commercial landscaping self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 1.3 million adjusted EBITDA, 1-1.5 million for last 6-7 years
Nicolas Lulli Polisistemas (via Kolka Capital) Records management and document storage independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: $1 million
Nik Hulewsky Nikonomics Medical billing and home health self-funded n/a
Obby Robbie Shankar IT Total Care pool maintenance and service self-funded SDE/EBITDA: roughly 700k to 2 million SDE · Rev: 3 million to 10 million
Onu Okebie and Brian Boland HTL Freight freight brokerage self-funded PP: $1.5 million · SDE/EBITDA: approximately $500k - $1 million · Rev: just under $5 million
Panel: Chris Munn, Bakari Akil, Bruce Vann, Elliott Holland Multiple (Guardian Due Diligence, Lux Products, Graveshall Capital, remote acquisitions) Various (due diligence services, manufacturing, education technology, business acquisition) independent-sponsor | self-funded | traditional SDE/EBITDA: Bakari: $5M EBITDA (burlap bag company); Bruce: ~$750k SDE; Chris: >$5M revenue · Rev: Bruce: Lux Products; Chris: $5M+ across two companies
Pat Lajoie Flavor Crisp specialty food products - breading and batter for chicken self-funded PP: $700,000 · SDE/EBITDA: ~$210,000 · Rev: ~$80,000
Patrick Dichter Apple Tree Business Services bookkeeping and accounting services self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 330000 · Rev: 1.2 million
Patrick Norris Residential trash collection company (Massachusetts) residential trash collection self-funded PP: $624,000 · SDE/EBITDA: $190,000 · Rev: $624,000-$625,000
Paul Lajoie Heritage Hardwood (flooring business) flooring installation and sales self-funded PP: $900,000 · SDE/EBITDA: $300,000 SDE · Rev: $1.8 million (approximately $150,000 per month)
Paul Quirk Amber Home Improvements window and door installation self-funded SDE/EBITDA: £670,000 · Rev: £4.5 million
Pawel Kosicki Oakville Sight and Sound home theater and smart home installation self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 2.5x average SDE of last 3 years
Pete Ciaverilla Sharon's Heating and Air Conditioning HVAC contracting (residential services and commercial construction) self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 1.06-1.1 million (EBITDA) · Rev: 11.5-12 million
Peter DeBaptiste Joe Cole Plumbing high-end residential and commercial plumbing contracting self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 500,000 to 1.5 million
Peter Wild and Carlos Laconi Boston Tree Preservation organic plant health care services independent-sponsor Rev: couple of millions
Phil Miller Pawville pet care and boarding self-funded n/a
Philip Blackett Cemetery Services cemetery management services other n/a
Philip Hussey Thomas Moser high-end furniture manufacturing independent-sponsor Rev: approximately 20 million
Rafael Quinn Alternative Holdings industrial lubricants and filters distribution traditional PP: ~$1.2M (3.5x earnings) · SDE/EBITDA: $350,000 · Rev: $5 million
Raj Kankaria Lone Star Attorney Service legal services and process serving independent-sponsor PP: $1 million · SDE/EBITDA: $250,000 to $300,000 · Rev: $1.3 million
Ramon van Meer Alpha Paw pet e-commerce traditional PP: 325000 plus inventory · SDE/EBITDA: close to 200000 dollars · Rev: 700000 dollars (at time of acquisition)
Ray Chery & Dana Chery Monsam Portable Sinks portable sink manufacturing self-funded n/a
Reed Tileston Industrial services business (grease trap pumping, vactor pumping, industrial maintenance) Industrial services / environmental waste management self-funded SDE/EBITDA: just under 1 million · Rev: just under 2 million
Reg Zeller Cane Cast metal foundries / manufacturing unknown n/a
Renan Cortez Syndicate Building Solutions commercial real estate / syndication self-funded SDE/EBITDA: $2 million
Rick Ruback and Royce Yudkoff Harvard Business School Business acquisition / Small business buying unknown n/a
Rob Carpenter Merry Maids (three-territory cleaning franchise) residential cleaning franchises self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 200,000 in EBITDA
Robert Graham and Aaron Blick Pillar Health Group home health, home care, and hospice services self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 1.2 million EBITDA
Robert Graham and Jordan Carter Search Investment Group (SIG) self-funded search and investment self-funded SDE/EBITDA: ~8 million to 10 million run rate (portfolio EBITDA)
Robin Covitz Baskits gift baskets unknown n/a
Rory Tyer South Pleasantburg Nursery nursery and garden center retail self-funded PP: 2.5 million
Ruchik Gandhi Window treatment workroom Interior design / window treatments fabrication self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 15-20% · Rev: North of 3 million
Russ Hadlock The Auto Glass Clinic and Mobile Radio automotive glass repair and mobile radio/car stereo accessories independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: 600k · Rev: 2.3 to 2.5 million
Ryan Adams Rhino Shield Jacksonville coatings and painting dealership self-funded PP: $5 million listed · Rev: $3.8-5.4 million
Ryan Doyle Live Oak Bank financial services / search lending traditional n/a
Ryan Doyle Jeff's Pool and Spa Service residential pool and spa service, chlorine sales and delivery self-funded SDE/EBITDA: sub one million · Rev: low single digit million
Ryan Sullivan North Park Group manufacturing self-funded SDE/EBITDA: $500,000 - $2,000,000
Sajama Mitta CDMS environmental health and safety consulting self-funded SDE/EBITDA: under 2 million EBITDA
Sam Rosati Perimeter Solutions Group residential fencing independent-sponsor n/a
Sam Rosati Pursuant Holdings portfolio of small businesses across multiple industries self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 500k to 2 million EBITDA
Sam Turner Advantos HVAC and heating/plumbing for new residential construction self-funded SDE/EBITDA: approximately £0.5-0.7 million · Rev: £5 million turnover (first acquisition)
Sam Turner Advantos HVAC businesses independent-sponsor Rev: 22-23 million GBP (proforma basis with 4 businesses)
Sandy Page Explora Bio Labs biotech services traditional n/a
Sarah Chiles and Matthew Ferguson Aspen Total Automotive automotive repair and maintenance self-funded PP: 1.5 million
Scott Alexander Jairus Marketing Healthcare marketing (lead generation for chiropractors and dentists) self-funded PP: approximately $1.8M · SDE/EBITDA: 750000 · Rev: over 2000000
Scott Crosby American Services home services self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 250 to 500
Scott Duncan F&M Tool and Die injection molding and tool & die manufacturing self-funded PP: $3.6 million · Rev: 1.2 million (year prior)
Scott Walton Matrix Mechanical Group mechanical services (heating, plumbing, HVAC) independent-sponsor PP: $450,000 per company · SDE/EBITDA: $150,000 per company · Rev: $1 million per company
Sean Daly IC Cool HVAC services self-funded SDE/EBITDA: ~200000 · Rev: 1.5 million
Sean Lindley R&R Lifts forklift repair and maintenance independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: $550,000 · Rev: $1.2 million
Sean Moore Fascination Street Fine Art fine art gallery traditional PP: 5.3 million · SDE/EBITDA: 1.1 million · Rev: 4.2 million
Sean Stimpson Mitten industrial distribution - fluid connectors and hydraulic hoses self-funded n/a
Shane Ehrsam North Texas Trailers trailer dealership self-funded PP: four million dollars · SDE/EBITDA: 1.7 million in 2021 · Rev: nine and a half million in 2021
Shane Ehrsam North Texas Trailers equipment rental and sales traditional n/a
Shannon Jones Halstatt Legacy Partners business acquisition and search fund unknown n/a
Shawn Allard Novel ice cream retail self-funded PP: $1.25M · SDE/EBITDA: $275K · Rev: $1.3-1.4M
Shell Zhang Nadas Italy luxury travel / guided tours independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: little bit less than 600k · Rev: roughly 3 million
Simon Plummer BT Engineering insurance repair and construction self-funded PP: approximately $1 million · SDE/EBITDA: approximately $400k EBITDA · Rev: $2 million
Stephen Olmon and Colin Trimble Alarm Masters security and fire alarm other PP: just over one times revenue · Rev: 2 to 4 million
Stephen Quinlan, Paul Westhart Blue Wrench Auto Repair auto repair self-funded n/a
Steve Carroll Kelso Industries commercial and industrial mechanical electrical and plumbing other Rev: 1.2 billion
Sumana Sanjeeva Amazon FBA e-commerce business e-commerce traditional PP: 1.1 million
Tato Corcoran Brandt Molded Marble manufactured cultured marble bathroom vanity tops and showers self-funded PP: $1.3M for real estate + $550k for business · SDE/EBITDA: $150,000 · Rev: 350-600k
Tato Corcoran Brandt Molded Marble Molded marble and stone countertop manufacturing self-funded Rev: $400,000
Taylor Mattingly Energy Ogre deregulated electricity retail broker (Texas) traditional SDE/EBITDA: great EBITDA margins · Rev: well into the eight digits
Taylor Wallace Paws & Rec (doggy daycares) pet services - doggy daycare operations self-funded PP: high six figures (less than $1M) · SDE/EBITDA: approximately $300,000
The Wolf of Franchises (Anonymous) Franchise incubator (prior); personal research on franchise industry Franchising (multi-industry focus) other n/a
Thomas Smale FE International Software as a Service (SaaS) brokerage unknown Rev: 1 million to 50 million
Tim Ericson Short-Term Copier Equipment rental services traditional SDE/EBITDA: 750k to 2 million
Tim Lahey RHome residential technology traditional SDE/EBITDA: low SDE · Rev: $10 million
Tom Matter and Dawson Matter ProDuct Cleaning commercial kitchen exhaust hood cleaning traditional n/a
Toni Kononova Write My Wrongs book publishing and self-publishing services self-funded n/a
Trevor Boehm Saturn Five Small business holding company operator other n/a
Trip Biesanz GNC Glass Mirror and Construction glass and mirror construction and fabrication traditional SDE/EBITDA: 275K · Rev: 2.4 to 3 million
Trish Higgins Chenmark Capital small business acquisition and management self-funded n/a
Trouin Nguyen Nail salon rollup Nail salon services - retail self-funded SDE/EBITDA: 225000 (25% margin on 900k revenue) · Rev: 900000 to 1100000
Tyler Gordon, Zach Gordon Basecamp (parent company of Uptown Cheapskate and Kid to Kid) used merchandise retail / thrift independent-sponsor n/a
Tyler O'Connor Bird Golf Academy private golf education self-funded n/a
Tyler O'Connor Bird Golf Academy golf education and instruction self-funded SDE/EBITDA: approximately $900k to $1M · Rev: mid to low seven figures (projected for 2022)
Tyrel Sulzer and Bob Boniface TransTech Commercial driver license training school traditional PP: ~5x EBITDA · SDE/EBITDA: ~1.5 million · Rev: 7 million
Ujwal Velagapudi Multiple: commercial real estate portfolio, bar, gym, e-commerce (FBA), SaaS, vending real estate; hospitality; e-commerce; software self-funded PP: 20 grand (first building); 180-400k range (other deals) · SDE/EBITDA: 5 million (e-commerce trailing 12) · Rev: varies by business
Ville Matias Vilen Phineasi (Easy Swing brand) mechanical cattle brush manufacturing other SDE/EBITDA: $250,000 · Rev: $900,000
Will Gano Bear Stewart bakery ingredient manufacturing self-funded n/a
Will Wright Peerless Events & Tents event rental and equipment rental traditional SDE/EBITDA: $2 million · Rev: $12 million
Yan Roll Victoria Renovations residential general contracting self-funded SDE/EBITDA: $1.2 million · Rev: $6 million
Yan Vinarskiy Floor Guard floor coatings manufacturing and installation independent-sponsor SDE/EBITDA: $3.7 million EBITDA (actual; owner originally disclosed as $1M+) · Rev: approximately $4 million
Zack Mutnik Mutts Electric residential electrical contracting traditional PP: 1.651 million · SDE/EBITDA: approximately 700,000 · Rev: 1.7 million (2023), 1.3 million (2024)
Zack Smith American Dental Care Partners dental marketplace self-funded SDE/EBITDA: under half a million